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The reservations I have about Downs's methods and conclu-
sions, though they are serious, do not negate the book's usefulness 
as a realistic study of the first amendment in action. The Skokie 
case is a hard problem, and as Judge Sprecher said, "[E]ach court 
dealing with [the case has felt] the need to apologize for its result." 
Downs may not change the results, but he helps us understand the 
need for apologies. 
A THEORY OF RIGHTS: PERSONS UNDER LAWS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND MORALS. By Carl Wellman.' 
Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld. 1985. Pp. 225. 
$34.95. 
Ernest van den Haag2 
Rights are incessantly being manufactured in the U.S. (and on 
a global scale by the U.N.) with little thought being given to the 
nature and usefulness of the product, or the legitimacy of the manu-
facture. So I looked forward to Professor Carl Wellman's A Theory 
of Rights, thinking that he would scrutinize the process of produc-
tion. I was disappointed. 
Professor Wellman goes back to Hohfeld's distinction among 
rights, claims, privileges, powers, and immunities, not to speak of 
the correlative duties-commenting on it, clarifying it here and 
there and, perhaps, sharpening it. Herein lies his claim of original-
ity, too often reiterated. Although I do not think that Wellman's 
revisions (some acknowledging the influence of H.L.A. Hart) are 
world-shaking, his work might have been useful, were it not for his 
irritatingly repetitive style and a pedantic habit of making distinc-
tions ad infinitum, some without a difference, others conceivably of 
some use, most unneeded. Sometimes Wellman's writing borders 
on self-parody: "The core of this right, as I conceive it, is the moral 
liberty of the pregnant woman to obtain an abortion. For the sake 
of brevity, I shall use the word 'woman' somewhat loosely to refer 
to any woman or girl of child-bearing age." Must we be told that 
the liberty to obtain an abortion pertains to a "pregnant" woman 
(have others been applying?) only if she is "of child-bearing age" 
(ditto) or that "woman" may "loosely" refer to "any woman 
or girl"? Unfortunately this passage is no exception. Although 
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Wellman seems well acquainted with contemporary theories of 
rights and handles them readily, his prolixity makes it hard to read 
him and the work as a whole bogs down. Despite occasional in-
sights, reading his book is unrewarding. 
Consider what Wellman has to say on moral rights. He in-
troduces his argument unpromisingly by stating "it will be helpful 
to begin by explaining what I mean by asserting the reality of moral 
rights. Precisely what does it mean to assert the existence of a 
moral right ... ?" One might reluctantly forgive the habit of saying 
everything twice, if something were said. But he goes on: 
Since a right is a complex structure of Hohfeldian positions, it means to assert the 
existence of a set of moral positions related in the special way revealed by my do-
minion model of rights. Moral positions are not entities in the world in anything 
like the sense in which physical objects or even persons are; they are not even enti-
ties in whatever sense points in space or positions in space-time are ontological 
realities. 
Whoever thought that moral rights, or any rights, are like physical 
objects rather than norms, relations, or imperatives? We are not 
told. (Surely we all know that customs "exist" without being physi-
cal objects?) Wellman concludes: "A Hohfeldian model of rights 
makes it clear that this sort of ontological commitment is unneces-
sary." Great. 
Wellman attributes the "ontological commitment" to those 
who believe that moral (natural) rights derive from human nature 
or are "objectively real but not empirically observable," so that they 
must have "some sort of being or some existence." He goes on: 
"What seem to be assertions of the existence of dubious nonnatural 
objects are, literally, assertions about moral reasons and their bear-
ing upon human conduct." If I understand this passage correctly-
and I must be diffident-it means that there are moral reasons for 
moral rights. Does this amount to more than: there are moral 
rights therefore there are moral rights? I guess it depends on the 
"moral reasons." These reasons are, says Wellman, "typically facts, 
such as the fact that Jones promised Smith to mow his lawn." 
Surely this is circular if one adds, as one must, that promises must 
be kept for moral reasons. If one does not, the passage makes no 
sense whatever. 
Matters are not helped when Wellman asserts that "factual 
statements can rationally justify moral conclusions." I don't think 
they can, unless they include a moral premise. He rejects as "dog-
matic skepticism" based on "inadequate epistemology" the view of 
those who do not agree that factual statements can, by themselves, 
rationally justify moral conclusions. Yet in his very next para-
graph, he seems to withdraw his rejection, when he writes that one 
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may "doubt the existence of natural rights on the grounds [sic] that 
one has yet to find any reasoning of this sort [that would justify 
them] that is undoubtedly valid" and "[u]nless one can find more 
persuasive arguments for premises about natural facts to conclu-
sions about moral rights" one may question "the existence of moral 
rights." Unfortunately I haven't found any (if asseverations are not 
arguments) let alone more persuasive ones in Wellman's book. 
Wellman refers to his own doubts as "provisional skepticism" based 
on "critical reflection," or as "[an] other sort of skepticism" which 
"is more modest." However, the doubts of others are pejoratively 
labelled "dogmatic skepticism." No intelligible reason is given for 
rejecting (and then accepting) the view that moral conclusions can-
not be drawn from factual statements alone, nor for calling it "dog-
matic skepticism" when held by others, and "provisional 
skepticism" when held by the author. 
Professor Wellman has not helped his readers understand the 
"existence" of natural and moral rights. (Nobody ever doubted 
that there are legal rights.) His claim that "I have explained and 
defended an original model of rights" is unpersuasive and he has 
not succeeded with me in his attempt "to convince you, my patient 
reader, that my conceptual framework is both a more accurate and 
a more useful way to think about rights than the alternatives." 
